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Wording and gender effects in a Game of Chicken 








In this short paper, we run an experiment to investigate the influence of a very basic change in 
the labelling of the strategies on cooperative behaviour in a standard Game of Chicken. Our 
between-subject experimental design involves two treatments. The only difference between 
them is that we introduce either a socially-oriented wording (‘I cooperate’/‘I do not 
cooperate’) or colours (Red/Blue) to designate strategies. Our study replicates the findings 
obtained in a previous experimental study based on a Game of Chicken framework with 
incomplete information and a within-subject design: the level of cooperation appears to be 
higher in the socially-oriented context, due to a change in women behaviour only. 
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 The Game of Chicken (GC), also called the Hawk-Dove game, aims at capturing a kind 
of social dilemma that can be seen as more appropriate for investigating cooperative 
behaviour than the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) (Thaler and Camerer, 2003). An 
archetypical GC situation is the car race with two drivers driving toward each other from 
opposite directions (see for instance Madani, 2010). Both drivers wish to avoid swerving, 
since the first one to swerve appears to be the “chicken” of the game. But death is even worse 
than shame, and the worst outcome is death for both drivers if none of them swerves and 
crash finally occurs.  
To put it in more general words, the GC resembles the PDG in that it makes bilateral 
cooperation more profitable than bilateral defection, but differs from the PDG in that it makes 
bilateral (instead of unilateral) defection the worst outcome (see Boffa and Olarreaga, 2012 
for instance). Moreover, while in a PDG it is never rational to cooperate (i.e. defection is the 
dominant strategy), in a GC a player has interest to cooperate if she expects her partner to 
defect (even though she will be declared the “chicken” of the game by doing so).  
Many social, political and economic situations can be described using a GC payoff 
structure, such as military or political conflict (Snyder, 1971; Stone, 2001), environmental and 
climate negotiations (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; DeCanio and Fremstad, 2011; Ward, 
1993), management of environmental resources (Madani, 2010), international trade 
agreements (Boffa and Olarreaga, 2012), interactions on the labour market (Cason and 
Sharma, 2007) and even parental investment (Kanazawa and Still, 2000). However, despite its 
interesting descriptive properties, GC-type choice situations have not been much investigated, 
be it theoretically or empirically, as compared to the PDG (see however Neugebauer et al., 
2008 or Skyrm and Zollman, 2010 for recent analyses). 
In this paper, we are interested in framing, and especially in ‘label’ framing, which 
refers to the manipulation of wording and labelling. In interactive settings, several 
characteristics of the choice situation allow frame manipulation in terms of wording and 
labelling, such as game’s title, game’s characterization, players’ strategies and players’ type. 
A quite general empirical result is that people tend to exhibit a more cooperative behaviour in 
the presence of socially-oriented wording/labelling (see Rege and Telle, 2004 and Zhong et 
al., 2007 for references). Moreover, this effect appears to be gender-dependent: most of the 
time, women seem to be more sensitive than men to the wording/labelling effect (e.g. 
Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Harvey et al., 1997). So, the 
peculiar purpose of the present experimental research is to use a standard GC payoff structure 
to investigate whether, and in what direction, a very basic change in the labelling of the 
strategies is likely to affect cooperative behaviour, and whether such framing effect is gender-
dependent or not. 
In another paper (Cabon-Dhersin and Etchart-Vincent, 2013), we report a similar-in-
spirit experimental study based on a one-shot GC under incomplete information (Cabon-
Dhersin and Ramani, 2007) and a within-subject design. Thus, a major rationale for this 
explorative study is methodological and follows from the replicability principle on which 
experimental knowledge is based: investigate whether the gender-dependent framing effect 
that we observed previously is robust to the use of a more basic theoretical setting (a standard 
GC as described below) and change in the experimental design (use of a between-subject 
design).  
As in our previous study, both a (baseline) context-free setting and a socially-oriented 
setting were introduced. The only difference between the two was a slight change in the 
labelling of strategies: in the context-free setting, strategies were labelled neutrally using 
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colours (“play red/play blue”)3, while in the socially-oriented setting, they were labelled with 
an explicit reference to cooperation (as “I cooperate/I do not cooperate”). Wording 
manipulation was deliberately circumscribed to the labelling of strategies, in order to capture 
and isolate the influence of the word ‘cooperation’ (which can be viewed as a socially and 
morally strongly connoted word, but is still only a single word) on cooperative behaviour, all 
other things being equal. Our results suggest that (i) subjects tend to cooperate more than 
theoretically predicted in both treatments (ii) the socially-oriented setting induces a slightly 
more cooperative behaviour than the context-free treatment; (iii) no gender effect seems to be 
at play in the neutral setting, while women appear to cooperate somewhat more than men in 
the socially-oriented setting. 
 
2. The Game of Chicken 
 
In the GC, the players have to choose (independently from each other) whether to 
cooperate (c) or to defect (d). With X the cooperative outcome (resulting from bilateral 
cooperation), Y the defection outcome (resulting from bilateral defection), H the free-riding 
payoff (the payoff of the defective partner in case of unilateral defection) and L the sucker 
payoff (the payoff of the “chicken” in case of unilateral cooperation) the usual conditions 


















































Figure 1: The general GC payoff structure and  
the peculiar GC payoff structure used in the two treatments 
 
It is worth noticing that the payoff structure of the (one-shot) GC makes cooperation 
possible, while the payoff structure of the (one-shot) PDG prevents the emergence of 
cooperation by making defection the dominant strategy. GC displays two asymmetric pure-
strategy Nash equilibria (c, d) and (d, c) and one mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each 
player mixes c and d with probability (1 – ) and  respectively. The expected payoff of 
                                                 
3
 We are fully aware that colours may be considered as non-neutral, even though we are not the first to use 
colours to label strategies (see for instance Chaudhuri et al., 2002; Kotani et al., 2008; and the references in 
Zhong et al., 2007). This point is discussed further in Cabon-Dhersin and Etchart-Vincent (2013). 
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cooperation is (1 – )X + L, while the expected payoff of defection is (1 – )H + Y. Hence, 
each player’s optimum strategy is to cooperate if (1 – )X + L > (1 – )H + Y, i.e. if 
( ) ( )
H X






If we define the best-reply correspondence h() of each player as the optimum 
probability of playing the defective strategy depending on , then h() is given by: 
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A symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium is given by a pair of probabilities (*, *) such 
that *∈ h(*). Only three equilibria are possible, namely (0,1), (1,0) and (*, *). Note that 
the mixed-strategy equilibrium can also be viewed as the result of the aggregation of 
individual pure strategies, with a proportion (1 – *) of players choosing c and a proportion 
* of players choosing d (Oechssler, 1997). 
 
3. Experimental design 
 
For our exploration study, two very simple questionnaires were built, involving a 
single interactive decision each, and displayed as a matrix of gains depending on each 
partner’s choice. Both were based on a one-shot GC. The corresponding payoff matrices are 
given on Figure 1 (right tables, up and down). The only difference between the questionnaires 
is a slight change in the labelling of the (cooperative/defective) strategies, which were 
designated as ‘red’/‘blue’ in the context-free (baseline) treatment (as in Chaudhuri et al., 
2002), and as ‘I cooperate’/‘I do not cooperate’ in the socially-oriented treatment. In the 
following, the context-free treatment will be denoted BR, while the socially-oriented 
treatment will be denoted COOP.  
Note that, contrary to what is done in most experimental designs (including our former 
one), our choice situations did not involve monetary payoffs. We expected our subjects 
(young university students) to be more familiar with (and more sensitive to) grades than small 
amounts of money. So the payoffs in the matrices were given in terms of the extra-grade they 
could get in their final evaluation of the course during which the experiment was run, 
depending on their behaviour as well as on the behaviour of their partner in the game.  
An obvious ethical impediment prevented us from implementing real payments. 
Nevertheless, before filling in the questionnaire, the subjects were asked to make their 
decision as if the choice situation was to be played for real, partnering another participant. We 
all the more expected the possibility for extra-grades to be vivid for the subjects, be they real 
of hypothetical, since the experiment was run in the same session as a graded test, and just 
before the test itself4.  
                                                 
4
 The subjects’ attitude during the experiment confirms that they were already under stress (due to the real test 
coming after the experimental session), and actually highly concerned with the possibility – be it real or 
hypothetical – of getting an extra grade. Moreover, a similar level of cooperation was observed as in previous 
experimental studies based on a GC framework with real monetary incentives (Butler et al 2011; Zizzo and Tan, 
2007), which suggests that our experimental design succeeded in capturing real behaviour. 
5 
 
Facing the matrix of gains in COOP (resp. BR), each subject had to decide whether to 
cooperate (resp. play red) or not cooperate (resp. play blue), taking into account that her 
hypothetical fellow player had to make her own decision at the same time. She was made 
aware that (i) if both she and her partner cooperated (played red), both would get 1 extra point 
to their final grade; (ii) if both she and her partner did not cooperate (played blue), both would 
get no extra point to their final grade; (iii) if she cooperated (played red) while her fellow 
partner did not cooperate (played blue), she would get 0.5 extra point to her final grade, while 
her partner would get 2 extra points to her final grade; (iv) if she did not cooperate (played 
blue), while her fellow partner cooperated (played red), she would get 2 extra points to her 
final grade, while her partner would get 0.5 extra point to her final grade. The subjects were 
also reminded to consider that their hypothetical partner in the game was facing the same 
decision to make. Before answering the questionnaire, the subjects were given written and 
oral instructions, and invited to call upon the experimenter if they had any questions. Then, 
they were encouraged to make their decision at their own pace. Each subject/questionnaire 
was identified using a number, to ensure her anonymity. 
The experiment was conducted in two different French institutions, namely a 
university (in Rouen) and a Grande Ecole (Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan, ENS 
Cachan in the following). A between-subject design was used: in each location, half subjects 
answered the BR (resp. COOP) questionnaire. Naturally, participants to the BR session did 
not have the possibility to communicate with those to the COOP session.  
156 subjects participated in the experiment: 76 in Rouen (38 in each treatment BR and 
COOP) and 80 in Cachan (40 in each treatment). In Rouen, the sample included 38 males and 
38 females; in Cachan, it included 40 males and 40 females. So, on the whole, our sample is 
both gender-balanced (with 78 males and 78 females) and treatment-balanced (with 78 
subjects in BR and 78 subjects in COOP). All the subjects were graduate students in 
Economics; all of them were aware of game theory and decision theory, but they did not know 
the Game of Chicken at the time of the experiment. All were between 22 and 23 years old.  
In each location, subjects were allocated to the BR or COOP session on a random 
basis, which ensured homogeneity across BR and COOP groups and allows us to consider 
that they were drawn from the same population. On the other hand, there might be significant 
heterogeneity between Rouen data and Cachan data, so we had to test for it before pooling the 
data. Even though some heterogeneity actually exists across locations5, it never reaches 




An overview of our experimental results is given in Table 1. In the following, we first 
compare the observed proportion of cooperative choices with the theoretically expected one 
(33%7), before turning to the comparison between behaviour in BR and behaviour in COOP 
among the whole population of subjects as well as among males and females separately. 
 
                                                 
5
 This point is discussed in Section 5. 
6
 We tested for behavioural differences between Cachan and Rouen on the whole set of data as well as on subsets 
of data organized by either session BR/COOP or gender. Statistical results are available upon request. 
7
 The theoretical proportion of cooperative choices (1 – *) is equal to1
( ) ( )
H X











N = 78 
Male 
N = 78 
Pooled  
N = 156 
Female  
vs. Male 
BR N = 78 38 40 78  
% Coop. choices 52.63% 37.50% 44.87%  






COOP N = 78 40 38 78  
% Coop. choices 72.50% 47.36% 60.25%  
COOP vs. Theory (p-value) <0.0001 0.066 <0.0001  




BR vs. COOP (p-value) 0.064 0.376 0.051  
 
Table 1: A synthetic overview of the experimental results 
 
 
4.1. Observed vs. predicted level of cooperation: a gender effect 
 
The theoretically expected proportion of cooperative choices is 33%. A proportion 
test8 shows that subjects cooperated more than predicted in BR (p-value: 0.031) and in COOP 
(p-value < 0.0001). Now, when looking at men’ and women’ data separately, it appears that 
men did not cooperate more than theoretically expected in BR (p-value: 0.576) while they 
tended to cooperate more than expected in COOP with a nearly significant difference between 
the two (p-value: 0.066), suggesting a slight indirect framing effect. By contrast, women 
appear to cooperate significantly more than theoretically expected both in BR (proportion test, 
p-value: 0.012) and COOP (p-value < 0.0001). This first set of results suggests that the 
observed tendency of our subject pool to cooperate more than theoretically predicted is 
actually mostly driven by women’ behaviour. 
 
4.2. Observed level of cooperation in BR vs. COOP: a gender-dependent framing 
effect 
 
As expected, a framing effect seems to be at play on the whole set of data, with more 
cooperation in COOP than in BR, even though it does not fully reach significance (p-value: 
0.051). Making the social background of the interactive choice situation explicit (through the 
use of the word ‘cooperation’) tends to promote cooperative behaviour as compared to a more 
neutral labelling. 
Now, when comparing men’ behaviour across treatments BR and COOP directly, no 
difference occurs (p-value: 0.376), while the difference in women’ behaviour across 
treatments nearly reaches significance (p-value: 0.064). The slight gender-dependency of the 
observed framing effect is confirmed with even more strength when comparing men and 
women behaviour in BR and COOP separately: women did not cooperate more than men in 
                                                 
8
 Because similar results obtain using Fisher exact tests and Chi-Square tests, only proportion tests are reported 
in the paper. Other tests’ results are available upon request. 
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BR (p-value: 0.175), while they significantly did in COOP (p-value: 0.019). This result 
suggests that women are sensitive to the use of the socially-connoted word ‘cooperation’, 
while men are not. Once again, this finding is not insignifiant from a methodological point of 
view: the fact that the seemingly general framing effect is actually entirely driven by women 
behaviour pleads for a systematic investigation of gender effects when investigating 
interactive behaviour. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Even though (deliberately) based a very simple experimental design as well as on a 
slight frame manipulation (that makes our test quite conservative), the present experimental 
study qualitatively replicates the flavour of the results that we obtained in a more 
sophisticated previous study (Cabon-Dhersin and Etchart-Vincent, 2013). First, subjects tend 
to cooperate more than theoretically predicted, and among them, women tend to be more 
prone to cooperation than men. Second, the ‘word’ cooperation appears to be powerful 
enough to enhance cooperative behaviour, but only among females. The robustness of these 
results to the change in most experimental features reassuringly suggests that they are not an 
experimental artefact, but rather genuine behavioural features.  
The power of the word ‘cooperation’ may be due to its normative appeal (Biel and 
Thogersen, 2007): making the social background of strategic decisions explicit may have 
induced among the COOP subjects a ‘perception shift’ from payoff-maximizing 
considerations (those that arise spontaneously in interactive choice situations, i.e. those that 
occurred in the BR treatment) to social considerations. On the other hand, if we consider 
social frames as coordination devices between people (Ellingsen et al. 2012), the use of the 
word ‘cooperation’ may have affected subjects’ beliefs and expectations as regards others’ 
behaviour, which in turn may have influenced their own behaviour (Dufwenberg et al., 
2011)9. 
Now, regarding gender differences in interactive behaviour in general, as well as the 
gender-dependent influence of labelling in particular, several explanations may be raised. 
First, gender differences in behaviour may be due to gender differences in terms of risk 
attitude. Indeed, women have generally been shown to be more risk averse than men. Since, in 
a Game of Chicken, cooperation is the safer choice (Butler et al., 2011)10, women are 
expected to cooperate more than men. This prediction is actually supported by our data. 
Second, as regards our gender-dependent framing effect, it may be the case that women are 
more sensitive than men to the social/moral norm underlying cooperation, or, alternatively, 
that they have stronger expectations that other people will cooperate (Bicchieri, 2006).  
Finally, we would like to underline a methodological point. In our study, we used two 
pools of subjects (from Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan on the one hand and Rouen 
University on the other hand). Since the difference in behaviour between subjects from 
Cachan and subjects from Rouen was statistically not significant (be it on the whole sample or 
in subsamples based on gender or treatment), the data were pooled for the purpose of 
statistical analysis. However, systematic qualitative differences actually arise between the 
pools. To put it in a nutshell, subjects from Cachan appear to be more prone to cooperation 
than subjects from Rouen, and men from Cachan appear to be more prone to cooperation than 
subjects from Rouen. We hypothesize that this difference in behaviour may be due to the 
                                                 
9
 As pointed out by Rege and Telle (2004), “a person’s beliefs about other people’s strategies will influence his 
own strategy. […] If a framing makes a person more optimistic about other people’s adherence to a norm for 
cooperation, then his dominant strategy may no longer be to defect.” (p. 1631)  
10
 This specification is important: in a PDG, the opposite pattern holds: the safer decision is to defect. 
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esprit de corps11 that is known to arise in Grandes Ecoles (a French speciality) and may make 
subjects from ENS Cachan more prone to cooperation, and more sensitive to the appeal of the 
word ‘cooperation’, than subjects from a university12. In this respect, our Rouen pool might be 
seen as more representative of a randomly selected population (in which people do not have 
much information about each other), and the behavioural pattern we observe after pooling the 
data might actually be seen as the product of two quite different patterns. The first one, 
observed in Cachan, would (to some extent) describe interactive behaviour in close groups, in 
which members are able to draw normative and empirical expectations about each other’s 
taste for cooperation. The second one, observed in Rouen, would rather describe the behavior 
of large and heterogeneous groups, in which members cannot easily speculate about others’ 
intentions and/or have no normative incentive to cooperate. It would be worthwhile designing 
a specifically dedicated experimental study to investigate more thoroughly the influence of 





                                                 
11
 The influence of esprit de corps on cooperative behaviour is based on both a normative expectation (one 
should not betray a fellow) and an empirical expectation (one expects others to cooperate). 
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